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ARGUMENT 
1. The fact that limited partnerships are "creatures of 
statute" does not preclude this Court from recognizing 
the common law right of a limited partner to sue on 
behalf of the partnership. 
Both the "Lenders" and Jeremy Service Corporation ("JSC") 
argue on appeal that because limited partnerships are 
"creature[s] of statute" that are granted express powers, "the 
courts cannot imply additional powers." See JSC's Brief, pp. 7-
8; Lenders' Brief, pp. 6-7. That argument is not well taken. 
First, the argument is substantively incorrect -- the courts can 
imply, and, in fact have implied, powers of limited partnerships 
that are not expressly granted by statute. For example, this 
Court held that a limited partnership can sue in its own name. 
Wall Inv. Co. v. Garden Gate Distributing, 593 P.2d 542, 544 
(Utah 1979). That power is not expressly provided in the Utah 
Limited Partnership Act, U.C.A. §48-2-1 et seq. (1953 as 
amended). Second, Hadlock v. Callister, 85 Utah 510, 39 P.2d 
1082, 1085 (1935) cited by both defendants in support of the 
proposition that courts cannot imply powers not expressly granted 
to a limited partnership actually refutes that proposition. 
Hadlock does state that the grant of powers to corporations with 
respect to disposing of property "is limited by the express 
language of R.S. Utah 1933, 7-3-45 . . ." JxL However, Hadlock 
goes on to hold that a corporation also possesses "such implied 
powers as are necessary, usual or incidental to its business," so 
long as the implied powers are exercised in a proper manner. 
Id, Finally, plaintiffs note that defendants' argument boils 
down to a contention that a technical rule should be blindly 
applied despite the private injustice and public injury that 
might result. 
The fact that limited partnerships are "creatures of 
statute" does not preclude this Court from recognizing the 
limited partner's common law derivative right. 
2. Neither the revisions to the Uniform Limited Partnership 
Act nor the Utah Legislature's failure to adopt those 
revisions prohibit the recognition of a limited 
partner's common law derivative right. 
The Lenders and JSC both note that the 1976 revisions to the 
Uniform Limited Partnership Act expressly recognize the right of 
a limited partner to sue derivatively. See Lenders' Brief, p. 6, 
n. 1; JSC's Brief, p. 10; Uniform Limited Partnership Act (rev.) 
§§1001-1004. From this defendants argue that (1) it is therefore 
clear that the ULPA does not authorize derivative actions; and 
(2) some significance should be given to the fact that the Utah 
Legislature has not adopted the Revised Act. These arguments do 
not preclude the recognition of the common law derivative right 
of a limited partner. 
Plaintiffs do not contend that the ULPA specifically 
authorizes derivative suits by limited partners. The relevant 
point is that the ULPA does not abolish a limited partner's 
common law derivative right. Thus, as explained in appellant's 
previous brief, the analysis shifts to a determination of whether 
the right of a limited partner to sue derivatively should be 
-2-
1 
recognized in accordance with public policy and the rules of 
statutory construction. Appellants respectfully submit that this 
question should be answered in the affirmative. 
The inference defendants draw from the nonadoption of the 
RULPA is similarly flawed. The fact that the Utah Legislature 
has not adopted an express recognition of a limited partnerfs 
common law right does not mean that it has rejected it. The 
Legislature has only amended one section of the Utah Limited 
Partnership Act in the sixty-five years since its enactment. 
That amendment took place before the Uniform Act was revised. 
See Utah Code Ann. §48-2-13 (1953 as amended by L. 1975, ch. 139, 
§1). Legislative inaction is a weak reed on which to lean in 
determining legislative intent. Quinn v. State, 124 Cal.Rptr. 1, 
539 P.2d 761 (1976); Barry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 421 P.2d 996 
(1966). 
Finally, insofar as the revisions to the Uniform Act are 
relevant to the issue of whether a limited partner can sue 
derivatively in Utah, those revisions indicate that such a right 
should be recognized by this Court. The fact that the RULPA 
expressly recognizes the common law derivative right provides 
testimony to the importance of the right. That fact also impugns 
the force of an argument that the right will conflict with the 
overall statutory scheme. 
3. The common law derivative right does not conflict with 
the Utah Limited Partnership Act. 
Lenders assert that the recognition of a limited partner's 
right to sue derivatively will provoke interference with the 
-3-
management of limited partnerships. That argument ignores the 
inherent limitations on the right. Permitting limited partners 
to sue derivatively does not allow them to indiscriminately 
interfere in management because the right cannot be invoked until 
the limited partner has requested that the general partner take 
appropriate action and the general partner has then wrongfully 
refused to act on behalf of the partnership. 
Lenders rely on Empire Investment Corp. & Associates v. 
Nielson Construction Co., 508 P.2d 804 (Utah, 1973) to support 
their argument that a limited partner should not have a 
derivative right. Defendants1 reliance on Emp i r e is misplaced. 
First, as defendants note, any statement in Emp i r e concerning the 
rights of limited partners to sue on behalf of the limited 
partnership is purely dicta. The basis of the decision i n Emp i r e 
is that the issues in the case had been previously litigated and 
then settled. Second, even the dicta in Emp i r e is not on point 
with respect to the issues involved in the instant case. The 
general partner in Empi re had taken action on behalf of the 
partnership. In this case, the general partner refuses to do 
so. Finally, as this Court noted, the rights the limited 
partners may have had in Emp i r e were purely personal rights and 
were solely against the general partner. Thus, Emp i r e provides 
no authority for defendants' statement that §48-2-26 bars an 
action by limited partners on behalf of the partnership against 
thi rd part ies. 
Defendants also point to 60 Am. Jur. 2d, "Partnership" §380, 
p.262, in support of their position. Lenders' Brief, page 9. 
-4-
That section states that "the rights of a limited partner are 
generally confined to the rights to have full information" etc. 
Id* (emphasis supplied). The major fault in the defendants' 
reliance on that annotation is that they selectively read the 
provisions of Am. Jur. to make their point. Am. Jur. 2d also 
recognizes that there is an exception to the general rule: "a 
limited partner can bring an action on behalf of the partnership 
when the general partners have disabled themselves or wrongfully 
refuse to bring the action." 60 Am. Jur. 2d "Partnership" §390, 
pp. 270-271. 
4. The common law derivative right of a limited partner is 
properly analogized to the derivative right of a 
corporate shareholder under the facts of the instant 
case. 
Lenders' argument that "there are material differences 
between corporate shareholders and limited partners," is 
primarily based upon the fact that limited partners have a direct 
right against the general partner, while corporate shareholders 
have only a derivative right to protect themselves. See Lender's 
Brief p. 19. That argument fails under the facts alleged in 
plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint alleges 
that JSC, the general partner, is a "shell" corporation, which is 
grossly undercapitalized. Thus, plaintiffs' right to bring a 
direct action against JSC for JSC's breach of fiduciary duties is 
meaningless. 
The Lenders also attack plaintiffs' analogy of the limited 
partner's common law derivative right to the derivative right of 
-5-
corporate shareholders, stating that "[c]orporate shareholders 
have a statutory right to bring derivative claims. UUCP 23.1." 
Lenders' Brief at p. 7, n. 2. Plaintiffs respond that, first, 
Rule 23.1 was adopted by the Supreme Court, not the Legislature, 
and, further, as discussed in detail in subpart 2, supra, the 
fact that there is no express statutory authorization for a 
limited partner to bring a derivative action does not preclude 
them from doing so. 
5. Defendants Lenders' argument that Utah law does not 
permit joinder of direct and derivative claims in the 
same action is not properly before this court. 
Lenders' Brief states that "[b]ecause no single reason was 
given for the trial court's ruling, respondents presume that the 
lower court considered and relied upon each of the grounds 
asserted in support of the Motion, and address those grounds 
separately herein." Lenders' Brief, p. 1. A review of the 
transcript of the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss reveals the 
inaccuracy of defendants' assertion. 
At the close of plaintiffs' counsel's argument, the Court 
states: "assuming all that's true . . . still, I -- how do you 
get around the statute that says unless you are a general partner 
you're not a proper party from proceeding against the buyer [to a 
proceeding by or against the] of the partnership? I don't see 
how you read it any other way." Transcript at page 20. 
Similarly, the trial court stated: "I don't think it's really a 
question of rationale. I agree maybe there ought to be a limited 
partnership derivative suit, but I can't read this language any 
-6-
other way. . . . I can't read this language saying anything else 
other than a limited partner canTt be a -- bring against a 
partnership." Transcript at page 30. Though the transcript is 
garbled, the fact that the argument presented by plaintiffs1 
counsel centered solely on the existence of a derivative suit, 
coupled with the fact that the Court's Order dismissed only 
plaintiffs1 derivative claims, rather than bifurcating 
plaintiffs' derivative and direct claims as would have been 
appropriate had the Court accepted defendants' joinder argument, 
make it clear that the sole basis for the lower court's decision 
was that Judge Daniels believed that U.C.A. §48-2-26 precluded 
derivative suits by limited partners. As the lower court did not 
rule on defendants' joinder argument, the determination of the 
issue is not before this Court. Plaintiffs respectfully submit 
that this issue should be properly determined by the lower court 
on remand, once the limited partners' derivative rights are 
recognized. 
Even if defendants' joinder argument were properly before 
this court, the defendants' argument is not well taken. 
Defendants cite Goodliffe v. Colonial Corp., 155 P.2d 177, 182 
(Utah 1945) as supporting the proposition that "it has long been 
the law in Utah that direct and derivative claims may not be 
joined in the same action." Lenders' Brief, at 16-17. In truth, 
Goodli ffe holds that insofar "as direct relief to individual 
plaintiffs sought by them in a derivative suit is merely 
incidental to the restitution of property to the corporation, 
such individual relief may be granted in the same proceeding." 
-7-
Id, (emphasis supplied). Goodliffe does note that in a 
derivative suit "those who champion the cause of action owned by 
the corporation cannot be permitted to assert in such a suit, 
claims hostile to the corporation and which are for their own 
exclusive benefit.ff JM. However, that does not preclude 
plaintiffs from bringing their direct and derivative claims 
together in this action. None of plaintiffs' direct claims in 
this action are adverse to the partnership1s interests. The two 
claims that are purely personal to Gerald Bagley and Bagley 
Corporation, for defamation and conversion, are asserted solely 
against the Lenders and their alter ego, JSC. These claims are 
not adverse to, and will not affect, the partnership. However, 
because these claims arise out of the same conduct of the Lenders 
and JSC as the derivative claims, they are incidental to the 
derivative action and therefore are properly brought in the same 
action as the derivative suit under the Goodli ffe "incidental" 
test. Defendants also cite Fanchon & Marco, Inc. v. Paramount 
Pictures, 107 F.Supp. 532, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) to support their 
joinder argument. Plaintiffs note that the District Court's 
opinion in Fanchon & Marco was reversed by the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals, 202 F.2d 731 (2nd Cir. 1953). 
6. Defendant JSC's argument that plaintiffs lack standing 
to bring this action is not properly before this Court. 
JSC's argument that plaintiffs lack standing to bring this 
action is not properly before this court. This argument was not 
before the lower court on the prior Motion to Dismiss. It is 
axiomatic that matters not presented to the trial court may not 
-8-
be raised for the first time on appeal. Franklin Financial v. 
New Empire Dev. Co,, 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 19 8 3 ) . 
CONCLUSION 
Limited partners have a common law equitable right to sue on 
behalf of the partnership i* -.« UM'HI I>a r 1, iw t vr ong f ul ly 
refuses or is unable to do so. The Utah Limited Partnership Act 
does n< abol - - - -.. uie lower court's Order 
dismissing plaintiff's derivative claims n the basis that U.C.A. 
§48-2-26 prohibits sue1 claims was . Plaintiffs 
respectfully request • - • 
this case be remanded r roceedings i >MJ *- M e t 
L 
DATED this <^1 day of \p^i- ,7. 
Je f f / S y ' L . S i1v e s t r i nil 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
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